Constitutional scholarship in Canada since Confederation has been characterized by two primary narratives. The dualist narrative, which characterized constitutional scholarship between the late-nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries, focussed on the parallel developments of provincial and federal constitutions. The monist narrative, which has become the dominant model of interpretation since the mid-twentieth century, focusses on the federal constitution as a singular foundation of constitutionalism in Canada. As a result of the shift from dualism to monism, provincial constitutions have become largely ignored in Canada and subsumed by the "mega-constitutional" politics of the federal constitution. This paper examines provincial constitutions to highlight the significant reorientation of constitutional scholarship in Canada over the past 150 years, which has become primarily focussed on post-Confederation constitutional history and written constitutionalism.
a constitution that is largely unmoored from the pre-Confederation foundations of its development. This article broadly traces this change in key writings of prominent constitutional scholars -those who wrote systematically about the historical development and legal principles of the constitution in Canada -revealing how the developing historical narrative of constitutionalism in Canada, which came to focus almost exclusively on the post-Confederation period, emphasized written constitutionalism and the federal constitution in particular. Provincial constitutional lineages, once central in Canadian constitutional scholarship, consequently became largely ignored and subsumed into a singular framework anchored in the Constitution Act, 1867.
As pre-Confederation constitutional history faded from the focus of constitutional scholars, so too provincial constitutions. This was not a coincidence. The growing concentration on the British North America Act as "the" Canadian constitution placed it as the primary focus of constitutional concern. Anything that came before, notably the development of political autonomy and constitutional government in British North American colonies, largely faded from view. By essentially regarding distinct British North American colonies as provinces in waiting and Canada as a nation founded in 1867, they reframed the constitutional development of those political societies into intimations of Confederation. Provinces are thus less likely to be regarded as constitutional communities in their own right, but rather as subsidiary cohorts of the Canadian constitutional order. This is often understood through the lens of the "act or pact" debate on the meaning of Confederation, but more substantially it is a reflection of the parameters of history in understanding constitutional law (Cook 1969) . The diminishing presence of provincial constitutions in the writings examined here is a symptom of the wider diminishing (and almost near disappearance) of the pre-Confederation period from Canadian constitutional analysis. 
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Confederation constitutionalism in key legal works published in Canada. This shows that the narrative of constitutional history bears greatly on our understanding of federalism today, though often in implicit ways. Much has been written about the development of federalism in Canada, especially in the early years of judicial review and post-Charter of Rights reorientations (Cairns 1971) . It is not the intention of this paper to reengage these debates, but rather to add to the discussion an often overlooked element. The development of constitutional narratives serves to shape the common sense of what the constitution is and is not, and to understand the relative absence of provincial constitutions therefore requires careful attention to the historical narration of the constitution in Canada.
Subnational Constitutions in Federal States
It is not common to hear about provincial constitutions in Canada today. In fact, provincial constitutions are so absent from political discourse and academic scholarship that they seem almost non-existent. As Wiseman (1996: 143) notes, "provincial constitutions barely dwell in the world of the subconscious. They are apparently too opaque, oblique, and inchoate to rouse much interest, let alone passion." Despite the perennial constitutional battles between levels of government that have become a regular feature of Canadian political culture, it is rare to hear provincial politicians invoke their province's constitution in political debate. Constitutions are one of the strongest symbols of legitimacy in politics, and yet for Canadian provinces, they are not part of the toolbox of political rhetoric. As Baier suggests (2012: 191) , this may be in part because of the "national unity imperative" that has dominated Canadian politics from the mid-twentieth century.
It is not the case that provinces do not have constitutions, but rather, that their constitutions are less readily identifiable than the federal constitution. Of course, as is the case in the British constitutional system inherited in Canada, many of the most important 
Pre-Confederation Constitutional Development in British North America
Provincial constitutions in Canada are varied and are less visible in part because they are based on a history of gradual development, which is anchored in a period before the province's entry into Confederation, with the exception of Alberta and Saskatchewan, which were jurisdictions created by the Canadian government after Confederation. It is critical to note that the constitutional narratives examined here are settler expressions of E -37 legal and political order, which rarely account for indigenous practices and norms of governance. The focus on settler constitutionalism is, as Borrows (2010) argues, only a partial understanding of constitutionalism in Canada. The development of European constitutional cultures in British North America was divided among different colonies that, despite shifting boundaries, eventually became Canadian provinces. In each of these cases, a myriad of statutes, conventions, royal instructions, and orders in council may be cited as elements of provincial constitutions. Most important among these is the principle of responsible government, which remains the foundation of parliamentary democracy in Canadian provinces but which is not spelled out in any particular constitutional document.
The disappearance of provincial constitutions is directly connected to the diminishing place of pre-Confederation history in modern legal scholarship, a process that began following the turn of the twentieth century. Baker (1985: 287) has illustrated how Upper Canadian legal culture quite literally dissipated in legal studies as a result of the disbursal of law libraries, creating a "discontinuity in the organic development of Canadian legal culture." As many of the sources that formed the basis of a distinct local legal culture vanished, so too did the historical narrative on which it was largely based. Though later constitutional scholars would seek to uncover the roots of an autochthonous Canadian constitution -one that developed as a consequence of growing autonomy and expressions local political sovereignty -by focussing on the period after Confederation, they in fact helped to deracinate Canadian constitutionalism, pulling it away from the roots that had germinated from the eighteenth century.
IV The practical consequence of this, as this essay examines, is that provincial constitutions are not typically part of considerations of Canadian constitutional law and history. This could mean, for example, requiring a "super majority" of legislators or a public referendum to approve changes to fundamental aspects of the constitution, such as the formation of the legislature or the electoral system. The absence of such an entrenchment, Tarr (2012: 190) argues, "may suggest that provincial constitutions are viewed as different in dignity from the federal constitution. They are more akin to ordinary statutes than to fundamental law." The laws and conventions that form provincial constitutions are therefore less likely to be described as such, though this has not always been the case.
Constitutional Dualism in Early Post-Confederation Scholarship
From the initial legislative debates on the subject of Confederation, there were concerns that a new written federal constitution would overshadow provincial constitutions. Christopher Dunkin commented on the "absence of a feature from the scheme -the non-provision of anything like provincial constitutions," adding that as a result "there may be no two of our six or more local constitutions framed on the same model" (Canada 1865: 501). Antoine-Aimé Dorion shared Dunkin's concern about the vagueness of local constitutions, noting that they were essential aspects of the federation plan, and should be "laid at the same time before the House" (Canada 1865: 267). Others like Dorion who opposed the federation scheme believed that the ambiguity of local constitutions would exacerbate the dominance and status of the federal powers. Leonidas
Burwell, for example, argued that provinces should have separate written constitutions that could be regulated by judicial review (Canada 1865: 446) . Similarly, in Nova Scotia, opponents of Confederation like Thomas Coffin worried that the plan was "one calculated to sweep away our constitution" (Nova Scotia 1865: 292). In deliberating on the plans for a federal union, the desire to maintain and even formalize local constitutions was thus an important element, especially for those who worried about the centralizing effects of Confederation.
When the British North America Act came into effect in 1867, its historical development and future prospects quickly became popular topics for legal scholars and public writers alike, generating sustained public interest in a way that would not be seen again until the major constitutional reforms of the late twentieth century. Even if its contents were rhetorically dull and uninspiring, the British North America Act provided a document that could be pointed to as the basis of Canada's constitution. Though some were initially reluctant to recognize a "written" constitution for a British society that typically venerated the mythos of an "unwritten" constitution, it was impossible to escape of provincial and federal levels of government. What tends to be lost to the more pronounced political controversies about the nature of federalism in those years is attention to the distinct transformation of constitutional narratives. Based on the compact theory of Confederation, the "provincial rights" movement, as Vipond (1991: 10) points out, germinated chiefly from a concern "to show how a federal constitution could be fit squarely and comfortably into a larger, pre-existing, and deeply rooted cultural system" and to ensure that the federal constitution "reconciled with the constitutive symbols that anchored their self-identity." XI The provincial rights movement was, from this perspective, less about "decentralizing" the federal constitution than it was about maintaining commitments to the existing constitutional architecture that defined the evolution of political life in the province. . Pointing to recent court appeals, he concluded that the "principle, that the provinces retained their old powers when they entered confederation and have continued to be governed by their former constitutions, was judicially consecrated" (41). The importance of this matter was clear in his pamphlet, as he feared that the attempt to deny the enduring existence of provincial constitutions threatened the "French race" in Quebec.
Inhabitants of the provinces, he wrote, "have a common interest in opposing the excessive centralization of federal power, the lowering of their legislatures, and the gradual disappearance of their constitutions" (vi). For Loranger, the need to stress the fact that provinces maintained unique "constitutions" was an essential element of his forceful defence of provincial rights.
Monist Counter-Narratives
The sense of a creeping centralization of constitutionalism that prompted Loranger's pamphlet was not without foundation. A number of writers in the decades following 
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Confederation put forward an argument that the British North America Act marked a complete break from the past. Loranger's worry about the "lowering" of provincial legislatures, for example, was illustrated in a book written by Fennings Taylor (1879), the Deputy Clerk of the Senate, which argued that provincial "legislatures" were subordinate bodies to the Parliament of Canada, which as a "parliament," had inherent rights and privileges not accorded to ordinary legislatures.
XIII This was obvious, Taylor believed, because the British North America Act expressly described a federal parliament, whereas the term was never used to distinguish provincial assemblies. This semantic dispute E -47 not in the written statute but in those unwritten 'conventions' which came to govern the relations between Crown, councils, and Assemblies in the old 'royal' provinces. In that sense the most fundamental part of our constitution -both provincial and federal -is not, and never has been, 'written'" (328). 
Implications of Monist Narratives
The term provincial constitution may seem rather peculiar today because of its general diminishment in constitutional scholarship over the twentieth century. It is not that the protection and assertion of provincial rights declined over the twentieth century (indeed, it can be said that it amplified during that time), but that claims of provincial rights became restricted almost entirely to debate over the federal constitution. This was certainly which is a key reason that advocates argue for an enshrined provincial constitution. It is particularly interesting to note that most references to a new Quebec constitution tend to be characterized by the assumption that Quebec does not currently have a constitution;
there are few references, for example, to the nineteenth century development of responsible government or the expansion of representative institutions. Thomas-JeanJacques Loranger's nineteenth-century plea to guard against the "gradual disappearance" of separate provincial constitutions seems entirely unrequited in this modern constitutional debate. Instead, discussions of developing a provincial constitution tend to proceed from the premise that a constitution must be written in order to exist, and that the "unwritten" historical development of political rights have little bearing on modern constitutionalism.
Conclusion
For the first generations of post-Confederation constitutional scholars, the subject of the constitution in Canada typically included consideration of two levels of constitutionsprovincial and federal. This was based on a narrative of constitutionalism that located constitutional origins of different provinces in their pre-Confederation development.
Alongside this narrative, however, gradually emerged a tendency to understand the British North America Act as a radical departure in Canadian constitutional history. The narrative that followed from this perspective was one that favoured a more centralized federal government and traced a timeline of development that usually began in 1867. As a result, the separate constitutions of provinces tended to be subsumed into the larger story of Canada's federal constitution.
The shift in constitutional narrative mirrored the more recognized constitutional debate about the nature of federalism in Canada and its interpretation (or transformation, as the 
